Secure coding in C and C++ for automotive
31 Labs
11 Case Studies
Audience
C/C++ developers
Preparedness
General C/C++ development
Standards and references
MISRA, SEI CERT, CWE and Fortify Taxonomy
Group size
12 participants
Outline
- Cyber security basics
- Memory management vulnerabilities
- Memory management hardening
- Common software security weaknesses
- Security features
- Using vulnerable components
- Wrap up
What you'll have learned
- Getting familiar with essential cyber security concepts
- Learning about security specialties of the automotive sector
- Identify vulnerabilities and their consequences
- Learn the security best practices in C and C++
- Input validation approaches and principles
- Managing vulnerabilities in third party components
Description
Your application written in C and C++ works as intended, so you are done, right? But did you consider feeding in incorrect values? 16Gbs of data? A null? An apostrophe? Negative numbers, or specifically -1 or -231? Because that’s what the bad guys will do – and the list is far from complete.
To date vehicles become highly connected – not only between the internal components, but also to the outside worlds. Todays cars are already running millions of lines of source code, and this introduces a new set of risks to the industry that is historically concerned about safety. Even though some of the attacks are still theoretical, many of the standards already started introducing security considerations.
Handling security needs a healthy level of paranoia, and this is what this course provides: a strong emotional engagement by lots of hands-on labs and stories from real life, all to substantially improve code hygiene. Mistakes, consequences, and best practices are our blood, sweat and tears.
So that you are prepared for the forces of the dark side.
So that nothing unexpected happens.
Nothing.
They said about us
Table of contents
- Cyber security basics
- What is security?
- Threat and risk
- Cyber security threat types
- Consequences of insecure software
- Coding standards in automotive
- ISO 26262
- MISRA C 2012
- MISRA C++ 2008
- AUTOSAR C++14 and the future
- Cyber security in the automotive sector
- Software security in the automotive world
- Threats and trends in automotive
- The CAN bus and security
- Case study – Vulnerability analysis of 77 OBD-II dongles
- Practical attacks against the CAN bus
- Case study – controlling the CAN bus through the infotainment system
- Memory management vulnerabilities
- Assembly basics and calling conventions
- ARM assembly essentials
- Registers and addressing
- Basic ARM64 instructions
- ARM calling conventions
- The calling convention
- The stack frame
- Calling convention implementation on ARM64
- Stacked function calls
- Buffer overflow
- Memory management and security
- Vulnerabilities in the real world
- Mapping to MISRA
- Buffer security issues
- Buffer overflow on the stack
- Buffer overflow on the stack – stack smashing
- Exploitation – Hijacking the control flow
- Lab – Buffer overflow 101, code reuse
- Exploitation – Arbitrary code execution
- Injecting shellcode
- Lab – Code injection, exploitation with shellcode
- Case study – Stack BOF in the Wi-Fi stack of the Tesla Model S
- Buffer overflow on the heap
- Unsafe unlinking
- Case study – Heartbleed
- Pointer manipulation
- Modification of jump tables
- GOT and PLT
- Overwriting function pointers
- Best practices and some typical mistakes
- Unsafe functions
- Dealing with unsafe functions
- Lab – Fixing buffer overflow
- What’s the problem with asctime()?
- Lab – The problem with asctime()
- Using std::string in C++
- Assembly basics and calling conventions
- Memory management vulnerabilities
- Some typical mistakes leading to BOF
- Unterminated strings
- readlink() and string termination
- Manipulating C-style strings in C++
- Malicious string termination
- Lab – String termination confusion
- String length calculation mistakes
- Off-by-one errors
- Allocating nothing
- Some typical mistakes leading to BOF
- Memory management hardening
- Securing the toolchain
- Securing the toolchain in C and C++
- Compiler warnings and security
- Using FORTIFY_SOURCE
- Lab – Effects of FORTIFY
- AddressSanitizer (ASan)
- Using AddressSanitizer (ASan)
- ASan changes to the prologue
- ASan changes to memory read/write operations
- ASan changes to epilogue
- Lab – Using AddressSanitizer
- RELRO protection against GOT hijacking
- Heap overflow protection
- Stack smashing protection
- Detecting BoF with a stack canary
- Argument cloning
- Stack smashing protection on various platforms
- SSP changes to the prologue and epilogue
- Lab – Effects of stack smashing protection
- Bypassing stack smashing protection
- Runtime protections
- Runtime instrumentation
- Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
- ASLR on various platforms
- Lab – Effects of ASLR
- Circumventing ASLR – NOP sleds
- Circumventing ASLR – memory leakage
- Heap spraying
- Non-executable memory areas
- The NX bit
- Write XOR Execute (W^X)
- NX on various platforms
- Lab – Effects of NX
- NX circumvention – Code reuse attacks
- Return-to-libc / arc injection
- Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
- Lab – ROP demonstration
- Protection against ROP
- ARM-specific ROP protection techniques
- Securing the toolchain
- Common software security weaknesses
- Security features
- Authentication
- Authentication basics
- Multi-factor authentication
- Authentication weaknesses
- Case study – Hacking the Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV hybrid
- Authentication
- Password management
- Inbound password management
- Storing account passwords
- Password in transit
- Lab – Is just hashing passwords enough?
- Dictionary attacks and brute forcing
- Salting
- Adaptive hash functions for password storage
- Password policy
- Case study – The Ashley Madison data breach
- The dictionary attack
- The ultimate crack
- Exploitation and the lessons learned
- Password database migration
- Authorization
- Access control basics
- File system access control
- Improper file system access control
- Ownership
- chroot jail
- Using umask()
- Hardening the Linux filesystem
- Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
- Inbound password management
- Security features
- Common software security weaknesses
- Input validation
- Input validation principles
- Blacklists and whitelists
- Data validation techniques
- What to validate – the attack surface
- Attack surface in automotive
- Where to validate – defense in depth
- When to validate – validation vs transformations
- Output sanitization
- Encoding challenges
- Unicode challenges
- Validation with regex
- Mapping to MISRA
- Injection
- Injection principles
- Injection attacks
- Code injection
- OS command injection
- Lab – Command injection
- OS command injection best practices
- Avoiding command injection with the right APIs
- Lab – Command injection best practices
- Case study – Shellshock
- Lab – Shellshock
- Case study – Command injection in Jeep Cherokee
- OS command injection
- Process control – library injection
- Library hijacking
- Lab – Library hijacking
- Integer handling problems
- Representing signed numbers
- Integer visualization
- The MISRA essential type model
- Integer promotion
- Composite expressions and type conversion
- Integer overflow
- Lab – Integer overflow
- Signed / unsigned confusion
- Lab – Signed / unsigned confusion
- Integer truncation
- Lab – Integer truncation
- Case study – WannaCry
- Best practices
- Upcasting
- Precondition testing
- Postcondition testing
- Using big integer libraries
- Best practices in C
- Lab – Handling integer overflow on the toolchain level in C and C++
- Files and streams
- Path traversal
- Lab – Path traversal
- Path traversal-related examples
- Virtual resources
- Path traversal best practices
- Lab – Path canonicalization
- Format string issues
- The problem with printf()
- Lab – Exploiting format string
- Case study – Format string problems in various infotainment software
- Input validation principles
- Input validation
- Common software security weaknesses
- Time and state
- Race conditions
- Race condition in object data members
- File race condition
- Time of check to time of usage – TOCTTOU
- TOCTTOU attacks in practice
- Lab – TOCTTOU
- Insecure temporary file
- Potential race conditions in C and C++
- Race condition in signal handling
- Forking
- Bit-field access
- Using ThreadSanitizer (TSan)
- Race conditions
- Errors
- Error and exception handling principles
- Mapping to MISRA
- Error handling
- Returning a misleading status code
- Error handling in C
- Error handling in C++
- Using std::optional safely
- Information exposure through error reporting
- Code quality
- Code quality and security
- Mapping to MISRA
- Data handling
- Type mismatch
- Lab – Type mismatch
- Function return values
- Unchecked Return Value
- Case study – #iamroot hash migration bug
- Omitted return value
- Returning unmodifiable pointer
- Initialization and cleanup
- Securely initializing objects and arrays
- Uninitialized variable
- Constructors and destructors
- Initialization of static objects
- Lab – Initialization cycles
- Declaration and allocation issues in C
- Declaration and allocation issues in C++
- Unreleased resource
- Unreleased resource – Synchronization
- Unreleased resource – Files
- Array disposal in C++
- Lab – Mixing delete and delete[]
- Language elements
- Function arguments
- Undefined and unspecified behavior
- Using dangerous language elements
- Using obsolete language elements
- Portability flaw
- Preprocessor – Using macros
- Multiple binds to the same port
- Object oriented programming pitfalls
- Accessibility modifiers
- Are accessibility modifiers a security feature?
- Inheritance and object slicing
- Implementing the copy operator
- The copy operator and mutability
- Mutability
- Mutable predicate function objects
- Lab – Mutable predicate function object
- Accessibility modifiers
- Memory and pointers
- Memory and pointer issues
- Pointer handling pitfalls
- Alignment
- Null pointers
- NULL dereference
- NULL dereference in pointer-to-member operators
- Pointer usage in C and C++
- Use after free
- Lab – Use after free
- Lab – Runtime instrumentation
- Double free
- Memory leak
- Smart pointers and RAII
- Smart pointer challenges
- Incorrect pointer arithmetics
- File I/O
- Working with file descriptors, structures and objects
- File reading and writing
- File access functions and methods
- Time and state
- Using vulnerable components
- Assessing the environment
- Hardening
- Vulnerability management
- Patch management
- Bug bounty programs
- Vulnerability databases
- Vulnerability rating – CVSS
- Lab – Finding vulnerabilities in third-party components
- DevOps, the build process and CI / CD
- Insecure compiler optimization
- Wrap up
- Secure coding principles
- Principles of robust programming by Matt Bishop
- Secure design principles of Saltzer and Schröder
- And now what?
- Software security sources and further reading
- C and C++ resources
- Links to automotive coding standards
- Secure coding principles
Pricing
4 days Session Price
3000 EUR / person
- Live, instructor led classroom training
- Discussion and insight into the hacker’s mindset
- Hands-on practice using case studies based on high-profile hacks and live lab exercises
Customized Course
Tailor a course to your preferences
- Send us a brief description of your business’s training needs
- Include your contact information
- One of our colleagues will be in touch to schedule a free 45 minute pre-training consultation